Drupal 2FA module skipped the second factor
Two-factor authentication is the control I stop thinking about once it's switched on, which is exactly why a bug in it deserves attention. On November 11 the Drupal Security Team published three advisories for one module, Authenticator Login Plus (2FA), plus a critical one for GraphQL Core Schema the same day. I read all four on drupal.org. The 2FA trio is the more instructive story.
Three bypasses, one module
All three advisories (SA-CONTRIB-2026-320, -321 and -322) cover auth_login_plus before 1.0.3, and all are fixed in 1.0.3. They are rated moderately critical, 12/25 to 13/25, and every one is marked "Theoretical" for exploit maturity. No public exploit is described.
- -320 (CVE-2026-126729): the module does not enforce the second factor for authentication providers that authenticate every request on their own. If you know the account password, HTTP Basic Auth is enabled and JSON:API or REST accepts that provider, you act as the user without the TOTP code.
- -321 (CVE-2026-126730): someone holding only the first factor, such as a valid one-time login link, can trigger actions meant for fully authenticated logins. That includes updating the last login time (which invalidates other one-time links) and running other modules' login hooks.
- -322 (CVE-2026-126731): under certain conditions a login is treated as having passed the password check when it did not, and another account's 2FA setup page can be reached. It needs a timing-dependent race, a local account, and control of the victim's email or knowledge of their password.
Why the first one matters most to me
Advisory -320 describes a pattern I recognise from my own configs. 2FA hooks into the interactive login form, but Drupal also lets you authenticate per request through other providers. If the second factor only lives in the form flow, any route that accepts Basic Auth walks around it. The advisory lists the preconditions (password known, a per-request provider enabled, JSON:API or REST on), so most sites aren't exposed. Still, "most sites" is not a plan.
A quick check I ran on my own setup: look at which authentication providers each REST or JSON:API resource accepts, and whether basic_auth is enabled at all.
drush pm:list --status=enabled --type=module | grep -E 'basic_auth|jsonapi|rest|auth_login_plus'
drush pm:list --status=enabled --type=module --filter=auth_login_plus --fields=version
If basic_auth isn't on, -320 can't apply to you. If it is, update first and then ask why you need it.
The GraphQL one, briefly
SA-CONTRIB-2026-316 (CVE-2026-126725) is rated critical, 15/25, for GraphQL Core Schema before 1.0.29. Password changes through the GraphQL API are not sufficiently access-checked: a user who can view another account can change its password, administrators included. It only applies if the User Login schema extension is enabled. The fix is 1.0.29, or disabling that extension, which also removes the login and password mutations your decoupled frontend may rely on.
My takeaway is practical. Update auth_login_plus to 1.0.3 and graphql_core_schema to 1.0.29 if you run them. Then audit every non-form door into your accounts, since a second factor only protects the doors it was wired to.